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Abstract: 
The WTO’s impact on bilateral trade remains puzzling due, in part, to previous studies’ 
failure to simultaneously address three issues: inclusion of zero trade, proper controls 
for multilateral resistance, and proper membership definition. Addressing all fails to 
suggest a positive effect. 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since Rose (2004) found little evidence of the World Trade Organization’s role in 
enhancing its members’ bilateral trade, a number of studies have employed the gravity 
model and attempted to solve this (p. 112) ‘‘interesting mystery’’. Unfortunately, all (to 
my knowledge) either estimate a theoretically inconsistent model by omitting controls for 
Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) multilateral resistance variables, or risk a potential 
sample selection bias by dropping country-pairs with zero bilateral trade. While the 
estimates in Rose (2004) suffered from both, Tomz et al. (2007) fail to address either, 
but claim to have solved the mystery by redefining the set of GATT or WTO participants. 
According to the authors, Rose’s (2004) failure to capture the role of colonies, de facto 
members and provisional members as nonmember participants led to a downward bias 
in the estimated WTO coefficients. Using a new definition of participation, which 
includes both nonmember participants and formal members, they find positive and 
significant effects of WTO participation. Next, Subramanian and Wei (2007, p. 173), 
allude to ‘‘four asymmetries in the system’’ and consider the WTO to have done a 
‘‘splendid’’ but ‘‘uneven’’ job in promoting trade. However, they exclude zero trade 
observations. More recently, Liu (2009) distinguishes between the WTO’s roles at the 
intensive and extensive margins. While the former refers to promoting trade among 
existing trading partners, the latter involves encouraging new trading relationships. 
According to Liu (2009), the aforementioned studies underestimate the effects of 
membership by omitting the zero trade observations and thereby neglecting the 
extensive margin. While Liu (2009) finds a positive and significant effect of formal 
membership after including the zeros, the result remains questionable due to lack of 
proper controls for the theoretically motivated multilateral resistance terms. The 
remoteness proxy used is considered by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, p. 170) to 
be ‘‘at odds with the theory’’.2 Finally, Eicher and Henn (2011, p. 146), control for 
multilateral resistance and ‘‘search’’ for ‘‘WTO trade effects’’ by employing the 
participation definition. However, they neglect the extensive margin. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature by estimating a theoretically consistent gravity 
model while avoiding the potential sample selection bias. In addition, sensitivity of the 
estimates to the two definitions of WTO membership – with and without the nonmember 
participants – is also analysed. Using the data from Liu (2009) at five-year intervals, the 
results are striking. In the full sample, the use of neither definition finds WTO countries 
to engage in significantly greater bilateral trade. Separate regressions for each decade, 
which also control for bilateral fixed effects, find membership to significantly promote 
trade only upon using Tomz et al.’s (2007) participation definition during the 1950 to 
1960 period. Hence, existing claims to have overturned Rose’s (2004) findings appear 
tenuous. In fact, if the lack of a positive and significant WTO effect is indeed a mystery, 
then the prospect of solving it by estimating a gravity model seems unlikely once the 
zero trade observations and controls for the multilateral resistance terms are included. 
Accordingly, Rose’s (2007, p. 2025) desire to see the question addressed beyond the 
‘‘confines of the gravity model’’ is timely.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical 
methodology. Section 3 discusses the data. 
Section 4 presents the results, while Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical methodology 
The gravity models are estimated in logs, with and without bilateral fixed effects. A 
theoretically consistent specification without bilateral fixed effects is given by 
 
(1)    
 
Here, Tijt is the real value of the imports of country i from country j at time t; bothijt is a 
dummy variable taking the value one if both i and j are treated as WTO ‘‘members’’ at 
time t and zero otherwise; oneijt is a dummy variable taking the value one if either i or j 
is considered to be a WTO ‘‘member’’ at time t and zero otherwise; distij is the distance 
between i and j; borderij is a binary variable assuming the value unity if i and j share a 
land border; landlockij and islandij are ordered discrete variables depicting the number of 
landlocked countries (0, 1, or 2) and the number of islands (0, 1, or 2), respectively, in 
each country-pair; comlangij (comreligij) is a dummy variable taking the value one if I 
and j share a common language (religion); colonyij (colonizerij) is a binary variable 
taking the value unity if i has ever been a colony (colonizer) of j; curcolonyijt 
(curcolonizerijt) is a dummy variable taking the value one if i is considered to be a colony 
(colonizer) of j at time t; comcolij is a binary variable assuming the value unity if I and j 
were ever colonized by the same colonizer; hostilityij depicts the intensity of military 
conflict between i and j; allianceijt is a dummy variable taking the value one if i and j 
were in a formal alliance at time t; CUijt (RTAijt) is a dummy variable taking the value one 
if i and j belong to the same currency union (regional trade agreement) at time t and 
zero otherwise; GSPijt (GSPjit) is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if i(j) offered 
preferences to j(i) under the Generalized System of Preferences at time t; and θit and 
θjt are the country-by-time dummies.3 The bilateral time-varying and time-invariant 
unobservables are denoted by ηijt and ϵij, respectively. To facilitate comparison to prior 
studies, specifications replacing the country-by-time dummies with remoteness 
measures are also estimated. 
 
Tomz et al.’s (2007, p. 2013) ‘‘benchmark specification’’ includes bilateral fixed effects. 
Liu (2009) also prefers including them on statistical grounds. The use of bilateral fixed 
effects controls for possible selection bias arising from time-invariant unobservables. 
Hence, the gravity equations are also estimated with bilateral fixed effects. However, 
given the length of the sample period, it is unlikely that any relevant unobservables 
remain constant over the entire period. As such, regressions are estimated separately 
for each decade. 
 
Finally, in order to include the zero trade observations, the dependent variable is 
considered to be ln (Tijt+1), as in Liu (2009). An alternative using ln   as 
the dependent variable is also tried (see, e.g., Kukenova and Monteiro, 2008). Since the 
two approaches yield very similar coefficient estimates, only the former are included. 
 
3. Data 
The majority of the data come from Liu (2009) for the years 1950 to 2000, at five-year 
intervals. Since the data includes the zero trade observations and more countries than 
used in Rose (2004), Subramanian and Wei (2007), or Tomz et al. (2007), it is 
considered to be relatively more complete by Liu (2009). However, unlike Liu (2009), 
here two definitions of WTO membership are considered. The first is the formal 
definition of WTO membership used in Liu (2009) (except for a few minor corrections 
made to his data). After the minor corrections, Czechoslovakia (for 1950, 1955, . . . , 
1990), Lebanon (for 1950), Liberia (for 1950), and Syria (for 1950) are treated as formal 
members. These changes rely on the sources listed in Liu (2009), and Tomz et al.’s 
(2007) accompanying datasets (available at http://www.stanford.edu/~tomz/pubs/pubs.s 
html). The second definition is Tomz et al.’s (2007) participation-based definition. In 
addition, given the launch of a new WTO database on trade agreements in 2009 and 
some discrepancies in Liu’s (2009) currency union variable, the trade agreement and 
currency union dummies have also been modified. Roy (2010) provides additional 
details. 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 reports results from the full sample without bilateral fixed effects. While columns 
(a)–(d) present estimates that rely on measures of remoteness to control for multilateral 
resistance, the estimates in columns (e) and (f) are obtained after controlling for the 
multilateral resistance terms via country-by-time dummies. Since the atheoretical 
specification resembles Liu’s (2009) log model, the corresponding regressions include 
(log) GDP, (log) GDP per capita, (log) area, and year dummies in addition to 
remoteness and the covariates listed in (1). While column (a) simply reproduces Liu’s 
(2009) pooled cross-section log estimates, the estimates in column (b) are obtained 
from the data at five-year intervals. Incorporating the corrections to the formal 
membership, currency union, and trade agreement dummies yields the estimates in 
column (c), which turn out to be very similar to the ones in columns (a) and (b). Thus, 
the results of the paper are not sensitive to the corrections or the use of data at five-
year intervals. 
 
Next, unlike the estimates in columns (a), (b), or (c), the ones in column (d) utilize the 
participation definition of Tomz et al. (2007). A comparison of columns (c) and (d) leads 
to a surprising result. Contrary to the findings in Tomz et al. (2007), the use of either 
definition finds country-pairs with one or two WTO members to engage in significantly 
greater bilateral trade, relative to country-pairs with none. Hence, the inclusion of the 
zero trade observations appears to render any concern over the proper WTO definition 
unwarranted. However, before placing too much faith in these results, one needs to 
properly account for the multilateral resistance terms. Accordingly, the multilateral 
resistance terms are controlled for in columns (e) and (f). While the WTO dummies in 
column (e) correspond to formal membership, the participation definition is used for 
column (f). The results differ strikingly from those reported in columns (c) and (d). In the 
theoretically consistent model, the use of neither definition finds evidence in  
 
Table 1 
Full sample estimates without bilateral fixed effects. 
 
 
support of the WTO’s trade promoting role. On an average, country pairs with at least 
one WTO member engage in less bilateral trade. Interestingly, the finding is again 
insensitive to the definition of membership adopted although the estimates are 
statistically significant only when using the participation definition. 
 
Table 2 reports the gravity estimates after including the bilateral fixed effects, but 
separately for each decade (e.g., the 1950 to 1960 decade uses observations from 
1950, 1955 and 1960). For brevity, only the coefficient estimates of the WTO dummies 
using both membership definitions are presented. While specification one (labelled 
Spec 1) omits the zero trade observations and the country-by-time fixed effects, 
specification two (labelled Spec 2) only includes the former. On the other hand, 
specification three (labelled Spec 3) controls for the multilateral resistance terms, but 
continues to omit the zeros. Finally, specification four (labelled Spec 4) represents a 
theoretically consistent model and includes the zeros. 
 
For specifications corresponding to Spec 1 and Spec 2, the statistically significant 
estimates support the WTO’s trade promoting role. On average, country-pairs with both 
WTO members are found to engage in more bilateral trade using either definition of 
membership. Although the 1960 to 1970 decade (Panel II), finds country-pairs with a 
single formal member to engage in less bilateral trade, such coefficients are considered 
to be less interesting by Rose (2004). Interestingly, the adoption of a theoretically 
consistent model is sufficient to question the findings corresponding to Spec 1 and Spec 
2. According to the estimates from Spec 3, formal members are not found to engage 
in significantly different volumes of bilateral trade, in any of the decades. While there is 
some evidence of WTO participants engaging in significantly greater bilateral trade 
during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1980s, the estimates are still susceptible to sample 
selection bias due to exclusion of the zero trade observations. 
 
However, the estimates pertaining to Spec 4 – the preferred specification – are even 
more striking. Country-pairs with one or two formal members are never found to engage 
in significantly different volumes of bilateral trade. Even when Tomz et al.’s (2007) 
participation definition is used, the trade promoting role of the WTO is restricted to the 
1950 to 1960 period. In fact, WTO participants are now found to engage in significantly 
less bilateral trade during the 1960s. Accordingly, by omitting the zero trade 
observations and controls for the multilateral resistance terms, existing claims to have 
explained Rose’s (2004, p. 112) ‘‘negative result’’ are clearly tenuous. 
 
Table 2 
Estimates for each decade with bilateral fixed effects. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Rose (2004) found little evidence of the WTO’s role in promoting trade. Although a 
number of subsequent studies claim to have solved this mystery, none has 
simultaneously addressed the issue of the zero trade while controlling for the 
multilateral resistance terms. Upon doing so, this paper arrives at striking results. 
Formal membership in the WTO is never found to increase bilateral trade. Once 
bilateral fixed effects are employed, country-pairs with one or two WTO members are 
found to engage in significantly greater bilateral trade only upon using Tomz et al.’s 
(2007) participation definition for the 1950 to 1960 period. Accordingly, existing claims 
to have solved Rose’s (2004, p. 112) ‘‘interesting mystery’’ are clearly tenuous. 
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